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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9547
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8490
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0753
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 6528
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 5379
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0605
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3639
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 1274
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9447
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 8849
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1056
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6704
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RUEKJCS/Joint STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 009706

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2015
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER MARR MOPS EAID ECON
SUBJECT: FATA: STRATEGIES AND REDLINES

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 007164
1B. ISLAMABAD 008541
1C. EMAIL TO SCA/PB ON TEHREEN PLAN 05/25/06
1D. EMAIL TO SCA/PB ON ODRP MEMOS 05/25/06

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Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, DSCG 05-01, January 2005,
Edition 1, Reason: 1.4 (B,D)

11. (C//NF) Summary. The stabilization of Pakistan's Federally Administered Areas (FATA) and the acceleration of political and economic development in this troubled region is a complex task that will determine the success of USG and Government of Pakistan (GOP) counterterrorism efforts. Since 9/11, GOP has implemented a series of strategies and initiatives intended to gain greater administrative control over the region, stabilize the turbulent law and order situation, boost development and increase GWOT successes. Each successive GOP attempt has been hampered by political constraints and administrative failures, but the latest comprehensive strategy--unveiled on May 9th--indicates that GOP is placing a higher priority on successfully implementing changes in the region. End Summary

THE FATA PROBLEM--IN BRIEF

12. (C//NF) The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are Pakistan's (and the GWOT's) most geo-strategically located territories. It is also Pakistan's least developed region. FATA tribesmen are notoriously proud of their Pashtun and Islamic heritage and of their right to self-governance. This heritage led the British colonial government to leave the FATA's administration to a loosely Federally Administered Tribal area with only the veneer of representative politics, an autonomous parallel judicial system, and a reliance on tribal social and legal codes for administration. FATA tribesmen have strong tribal ties and affinities with their Pashtun brethren in Afghanistan--ties facilitated by a porous border (demarcated by the "Durand Line") which only the Government of Pakistan accepts as an international border. It

is also an area where an administrative and legal vacuum--created by years of government neglect, the Afghan jihad and later Afghan civil war, and an increase in the level of strict Islamization--has been filled by Islamic community leaders, some with tribal and religious affiliations with former Taliban leaders, and other anti-Coalition militants. (Note: For more detailed information on the FATA's problems, consult Ref A).

¶3. (C//NF) When these factors are combined, they create the current operating environment in the FATA:
--Porous borders that allow for the safe-passage and safe-haven of militants;
--Rudimentary systems to promote law and order;
--Agencies susceptible to control by radicalized militants and clerics;
--Low levels of education, health care, and economic activity;
--Agency-level administrators with little influence or power with the tribes or central government;
--Separate and unequal judicial and political systems;
--Tribesmen hostile to non-tribal foreigners, including Pakistanis, and to any extended Pakistani military presence;
--Substantial Pak Army and Frontier Corps presence taking heavy casualties;
--Deteriorating security and increasing radicalization in two agencies, which may be spreading; and
--An outmoded and inept bureaucracy at the Federal and Provincial levels.

GOP'S NEW FATA STRATEGY

¶4. (C//NF) The GOP has long been aware of the FATA's problems, and since 9/11, has tried many successive strategies to "fix" FATA. Many of these have centered around military stabilization, stop-gap administrative changes, and

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promises for increased development funding that have not gone far. Faced with the reality of an increasingly unstable and radicalized FATA (particularly North Waziristan), significant military casualties, and the spread of law and order problems to the FATA's neighboring frontier regions, President Musharraf has become re-energized on finding a permanent solution to the FATA. This past winter, Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz appointed former FATA Chief Secretary Sahibzada Imtiaz as the Prime Minister's Advisor on FATA, charging him with drafting a new political/administrative strategy for the FATA (ref B). They also appointed Jehangir Tehreen to draft a strategy on jump-starting economic development and activity in the FATA (ref C). Not to be left out, the military has also re-iterated its integrated strategy (ref D).

¶5. (S//NF) Together, the GOP hopes to implement--in concert--a three-pronged strategy that calls for:

-- POLITICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGY (Ref B and Septel)

¶A. A new, stronger NWFP Governor;

¶B. Centralized decision making by the NWFP Governor (and unofficially the PM and President) (Note: The GOP officially appointed a new NWFP Governor-General (Ret.) Orakzai--on May 22, in the belief that a stronger, more military-minded Governor would be more capable of getting cooperation and implementing changes (Ref D) End Note.);

¶C. Integrated, unified military, economic, and development decision making at the FATA Secretariat;

¶D. Strengthened powers for each Agency's local administrator (the Political Agent);

-- DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (Ref C)

¶A. Creating a new Frontier Development Company (FDC) to oversee FATA development, and allocating \$2 million for its

setup;

IB. Earmarking up to \$600 million development funds over 5 years for development in the FATA (\$150 million for 2006) in a Border Areas Development Program that is run by the FDC;

IC. Asking the ADB and World Bank to draft a needs assessment for FATA by June 2006;

ID. Increasing capacity to utilize allocated funds for FATA at present only 65-75 percent of funds are spent);

IE. Developing a road network to benefit tribes; and

IF. Drawing up a \$150 million five-year "mini-Marshall Plan" to boost economic activity through: Reconstruction opportunity zones; agriculture and livestock management projects; 100 small dams; vocational technical institutes to train the workforce; community water schemes; increased spending on education and health; and development of the marble industry.

-- MILITARY STRATEGY

The Pakistan Army's FATA military strategy--articulated at the May 1-5 DCG meetings in Washington--aims to "Pursue the elimination of terrorists and deny the use of Pakistani territory for miscreant activity through the articulation of military, political, and development measures". In short, Pak mil will:

IA. Seal the border with Afghanistan effectively through
-troop saturation,
-reinforce bases,
-increased number of border check points,

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-40-50 mobile checkpoints, listening posts,
-strikes, raids and ambushes conducted by quick reaction forces and the Special Operations Task Force;

IB. Conduct close coordination with ODRP, CFC-A/CJTF-76, NATO/ISAF and tri-lateral intelligence agencies through liaison and mutual visits;

IC. Modify operational techniques to emphasize reliance on special forces to strike "miscreants" at short notice;

ID. Double the size of the Frontier Corps and enhance political administration (helping to build stronger political agents, and maliks) and ensure coordination between military and political tiers;

IF. Enhance integration of Frontier Corps and Khasdar forces, giving them greater role in maintaining law and order and preventing cross-border infiltrations; and

IG. Contribute to economic development to reward tribes that cooperate and increase inter-tribal alliances.

CONSTRAINTS TO FURTHER, FASTER CHANGE

I6. (C//NF) The far-reaching civilian (development and political) prong of GOP's counter-terrorism/FATA normalization strategies has been hindered by domestic political attitudes, problems in administration, shortfalls in absorptive and administrative capacity, and security problems. A revolving series of NWFP Governors, Political Agents, and administrative mechanisms (FATA Development Corporation, a new FATA Secretariat) intended to improve administration have so far failed at the task of establishing better control and faster development. Clashes in personality, administrative style (i.e., an ability to get along with the Corps Commander and FC leadership), and strategy (agreement with Musharraf's grand vision) have hamstrung each successive effort.

¶7. (SBU) To succeed, the GOP's new administrative strategies must also overcome a myriad of constraints and political hurdles, such as:

¶A. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRAINTS

- Absorptive Capacity
- Lack of Effective Administrators
- Administrative Mindset

¶B. REDLINES FOR TRIBAL CHIEFS

- US/Foreign Presence for Development
- Bigger PAK Army Footprint in FATA
- Resistance to Elected Local Government
- Resistance to Political Party Activity

¶C. OTHER RISKS

- Tribal demand for pullout of troops
- Tribal demand for negotiation with militants
- Tribal demands to Remove Political Agents (Note: President Musharraf has said that this is not an option at this time. End note.)

¶8. (C//NF) The military prong of the GOP's counter-terrorism/FATA normalization strategy faces its own series of constraints--mainly the GOP's careful balance of political priorities, tenuous coalition politics, and Musharraf's need to maintain popular support for his civil-military government. President Musharraf's carefully constructed ruling coalition enjoys the tenuous support of several political parties who have made announced that they will not support a larger GOP military deployment in the FATA or US military operations in the FATA (particularly air raids and operations) without express prior coordination. Mainstream and Islamist political parties also remain

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intolerant of civilian casualties and collateral damage, as well as the specter of targeting popular madrassas and mosques. Tribal leaders share this national intolerance of a larger footprint, but also may strongly (and militantly) resist a significant foreign/US footprint for development work, and a larger Pakistan Army presence in the FATA. Some are also likely to resist larger political changes, such as inviting political party activity into the FATA or integrating the FATA into NWFP.

COMMENT

¶9. (C//NF) The success of the GOP's newly articulated political, military, and development strategies to stabilize and develop the FATA hinges on political will, popular support, and good management. The availability of funding and international support are also critical. Past FATA strategies were derailed by ineffective management and Musharraf's political balancing act, which has limited the GOP's political and military flexibility. This time around, Musharraf, his advisors, key military officers, the FATA secretariat, and the new NWFP governor are re-energized for a

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hard fight. The questions are now whether the new NWFP governor can get the job done, and more importantly, whether the tribes will accept this new course of action.

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